Discussion of O. Blanchard

Fiscal policy as a stabilization tool. The case for quasi-automatic stabilizers

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Monetary-Fiscal policy mix: stark separation?

- Not in **theory** (HANK models)
- In practice \rightarrow Stark separation between MP and FP: stabilization vs redistribution.

Why stark separation?

- 1. Implementation lags
- 2. Political decision lags
- 3. Debt bias (preference for the present)
- \Rightarrow VAT quasi-automatic stabilizer good candidate

VAT as a stabilization tool: why yes

VAT as stabilization tool: why yes

- 1. In EU, VAT accounts for **30 percent** of total tax revenue, or **12 percent** of GDP.
- 2. Very **direct** measure \Rightarrow Households have to **buy something** in order to fully benefit from the policy, in contrast to **transfers** which can be **saved**
- 3. Instrument of **unconventional FP** at the ELB \Rightarrow Contrast to unconventional MP which relies on consumer **sophistication** (e.g., forward guidance)

 \Rightarrow Consumption taxes can replicate **negative real interest rates** and offset ELB.

4. Salience of VAT changes arguably superior to real rate changes

Expectations and agents' sophistication


- Assume agents are **k-level thinkers** (Bianchi-Vimercati, Eichenbaum, Guerreiro 2023)
- Higher government spending ⇒ GE effects: increased labor demand and higher labor income ⇒ Increase in consumer demand.
- The less sophisticated people are, the less they take into account the positive GE effects of higher spending. Lower levels of cognitive sophistication imply lower values for the **G multiplier**.

- Tax (VAT) policy relies on individual intertemporal substitution. Basic force is operative regardless of any GE considerations, i.e., people do not need to calculate the GE effects of tax rate to adjust their personal consumption decision.
- Tax policy can boost consumption demand and **support the flexible-price allocation** when the ZLB binds, even if people are very unsophisticated.

VAT as a stabilization tool: why not

The cons of VAT as stabilization tool


- Ability of VAT policy to stimulate spending depends on **price pass-through**. Evidence on pass-through is very mixed
- If pass-through is **limited** then most of VAT change reflected in **markups**.
- Example. In July 2009, VAT rate for **meals** consumed in French sit-down restaurants was reduced from 19.6 percent to 5.5 percent. Limited effect on **prices** and **employment**. Large effect on **markups/profits**
- Large distributional effects. In the long run firm owners pocketed around 55.7 percent of the VAT cut, consumers received the remaining 13.6 percent. (Benzarti et al 2019)



Change in VAT rate for meals consumed in French sit-down restaurants

Asymmetric price effects

- Asymmetry significant property of VAT changes.
- Similar to **interest rate** changes
- Prices respond significantly more strongly to increases than to decreases in VAT



Finnish hairdresser salons VAT change.

Asymmetric price effects (con't)


- Pass-through estimates used to inform policy typically do not differentiate between VAT increases and decreases ⇒ Likely to severely overstate the price effects of VAT decreases and understate the effects of increases.
- Failing to account for the asymmetry can lead to overestimates of the pass-through of VAT decreases by a **factor of 3** (Benzarti et al 2019).
- Temporary VATcuts may have unintended effect ⇒ In long run can lead to higher equilibrium prices once the VAT cut is repealed, benefiting firm owners at the expense of consumers.

A VAT Tax rule?

- VAT tax rate set as a function of the output gap / unemployment gap.
- This form of communication substantially **degrades the efficacy** of tax rate policy.
- When VAT policy communicated as a **rule**, individuals must forecast the **future** level of output / unemployment to predict what **tax rates** will be.
- If individuals are **limited** in their ability to compute GE effects, they will also be limited in their **ability to forecast** future tax rates.
- Translates into a **lower efficacy** of tax policy in stimulating demand.

Selective effect on durables

- **SVAR** with [GDP, Consumption, VAT tax rate] + Blanchard-Perotti identification
- Large effect on **durables**
- Akin to **interest rate** changes **(**intertemporal substitution effect)
- Selective effect on expenditure but effective at ELB



Responses of D and ND consumption to a 1% change in VAT (SVAR estimates)

State-contingency of VAT changes

- A suitable stabilization tool should work **better in recessions** rather than expansions
- Recessions are periods of (i) heightened **uncertainty** and (ii) tightening **credit constraints**
- Durable spending has an irreversibility (lock-in effect) ⇒ With uncertainty, irreversibility is more costly
- Constrained agents may choose to **reduce debt** rather than bring spending forward

 \Rightarrow Paradox: VAT changes **less effective** in recessions?

Conclusions

- Provocative paper
- Role of fiscal policy as stabilization tool more prominent in **theory** than in practice
- VAT rule requires agents' sophistication
- Effects of VAT changes depend on **price pass-through** and are typically **asymmetric**
- VAT isomorphic to interest rate changes: more salient but impacts **durable** spending selectively